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Abstract - The compliance costs of private taxpayers are not only affected by the tax law itself 
but also by its implementation through the tax authorities. In the following paper we analyze 
the effect of administrative actions on the compliance costs of private businesses. We demon-
strate in a theoretical model that compliance costs may partially be interpreted as externalities 
of authority behavior. As a result we expect a ”shifting” of administrative cost burdens from the 
tax  administration  to  private  taxpayers,  what  implies  an  economically  inefficient  outcome. 
Based on Belgian survey data, we find empirical evidence for the elucidated relationship. We 
give an quantitative estimate for the accordant effects and demonstrate, which activities of the 
administration are the most important cost drivers. Furthermore, we find empirical support that 
the effect of administrative issues is independent from the impact of the tax law itself. 
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1.  Introduction 
In addition to an optimal tax law, the optimal enforcement of tax regulations is an important 
economic issue. There is a comprehensive literature on this aspect regarding questions on the 
efficient budget of a tax collection agency (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1987, McCubbin 2003, Liang 
and Yang 2007) or on the optimization of auditing rules (Yitzhaki and Vakneen 1989, Cremer 
and Gahvari 1996, Nigrini 1996, Kastlunger et al. 2009). However, the effects of authority behav-
ior on tax complexity and the compliance costs of private businesses have not been taken into 
account within the theoretical and empirical literature. 
As has been stated by Gale and Holtzblatt (2002), administrative issues affect substantially the 
burden of red tape. On the one hand, the revenue service specifies the necessary compliance 
actions and information requirements that have to be taken into account by private taxpayers. 
On the other hand, the tax administration may support private taxpayers by information mate-
rial, a short processing time or advisory services. As documented by empirical evidence, the 
lion´s share of the overall cost burden resulting from tax complexity consists of the compliance 
costs of private businesses (for a review see Evans 2003, and Vaillancourt and Clemens 2008). 
For example, Vaillancourt and Clemens (2008) estimate the compliance costs of Canadian busi-
nesses at a range from 1.2% to 1.8% of the GDP, while the administrative costs of the Canadian 
authorities lie in a range from 0.2% to 0.5%. 
The literature identifies also considerable economies of scale regarding compliance activities 
that result from organisational specialisation, the cost degression and technological improve-
ments (Sandford et al. 1989, Allers 1994, Evans 2003). From this perspective, the support espe-
cially of small businesses by administrative bodies could result in a decrease of the cost burden 
for the economy as a whole. Hence, a ”customer-oriented” approach of tax administration could 
have a share in improving the productivity of the overall tax system (Barton 2001). 
In our paper, we analyze the relationship of the tax collection agency and private taxpayers 
from a compliance cost perspective. As the payment of taxes reduces the economic resources of 
private households and businesses, there is a need to control for the compliance with the tax 
law. Typical instruments of the tax authorities are tax audits and information requirements that 
reduce the information asymmetry between both parties of the tax evasion “game”.  
However, the use of these instruments affects not only the resources of the authorities but also 
cost burden of private taxpayers. Tax audits are time-consuming and information requirements 
increase the cost burden resulting from record-keeping. If the administrative authorities do not 
take into account this taxpayer part of overall cost burden, we expect a ”shifting” of red tape 
from  the  tax  administration  to  private  taxpayers.  We  demonstrate  in  a  simple  theoretical 
framework that these externalities of tax authority behavior could yield to an economically inef-
ficient outcome. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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Using survey data of private businesses in Belgium, we find empirical support for the expected 
correlation of authority behavior and compliance costs. Based on information about administra-
tive quality, we also give a quantitative estimate of the effects on the compliance cost burden. 
Furthermore, we find empirical support for the hypothesis that the impact of these administra-
tive issues is independent from the effect of the tax law itself. Our research implies that an en-
hancement of taxpayer services could have a share in reducing the transaction costs of the over-
all tax system. As well, an internalization of tax compliance costs in the decision-making of ad-
ministrative bodies should promote economic efficiency. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we analyze the relationship between the tax ad-
ministration and the taxpayer in a simple microeconomic framework. We demonstrate that tax 
compliance costs can be partially interpreted as externalities of administrative decision-making. 
Section 3 investigates the correlation of authority behavior and compliance costs in an empirical 
setting. The analysis is based on data raised by the Federal Planning Bureau. Section 4 con-
cludes the paper. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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2.  Authority behavior and tax compliance costs 
2.1.  Taxpayer 
Since the analysis of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) the compliance decision of a taxpayer is 
typically analyzed as a maximization of the expected utility resulting from post-tax income (for 
a review see Andreoni et al. 1998, Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, and Sandmo 2005). The taxpayer 
has the opportunity to decide which amount E of his gross income Y  is evaded.1 For simplicity 
we assume a linear tax function T . 
In addition to the tax payment, the taxpayer is also burdened by compliance costs  t C . Due to 
economies of scale, this additional part of the tax burden increases on a diminishing scale in the 
turnover or employee number of a business (Sandford et al. 1989, Hudson and Godwin 2000, 
Evans  2003).  Hence,  we  expect  a  regressive  effect  of  income  Y  on  the  compliance  costs  t C  
( , 0 > ¶ ¶ Y Ct   ) 0
2 2 < ¶ ¶ Y Ct . The literature implies further that the bigger part of the cost bur-
den  results  from  bookkeeping  and  documentation  activities  (Blumenthal  and  Slemrod  1992, 
Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002, DeLuca et al. 2005). Therefore, we assume the compliance burden 
increasing in the amount of information requirements  I that are defined by the tax administra-
tion. 
By  contrast,  the  effect  of  tax  evasion  on  the  compliance  cost  burden  is  not  straightforward 
(Slemrod 1989, Hasseldine 2001). On the one hand, tax evasion may be connected with hiding 
costs increasing the cost burden  t C . On the other hand, noncompliance and especially non-
filing could result in a reduction of red tape as the information requirements are not taken into 
account. In accordance to that argument, Erard and Ho (2003) find a negative correlation of es-
timated compliance costs and tax evasion. By assumption, tax compliance costs are fully de-
ductible from the tax base.2 If there is no audit, the disposable income  n X  of a representative 
taxpayer is characterised as 
( ) ( ). , , E I Y C E C Y T Y X t t n - - - - =   (1) 
The taxpayer is audited with a detection probability p.3   
                                                           
1   In a broader sense, our setting could also include tax planning actions. It has to be taken into account that not each 
planning activity will be accepted in case of a tax audit. A correction of tax returns in the past results generally in in-
terest payments and administrative cost burdens that can be interpreted as a penalty for the taxpayer. Therefore, it 
would be also possible to consider in our model the sum of evasion and avoidance activities that are not accepted 
by the authorities. Seldon (1979) denominates this sum as tax avoision. 
2   That holds at least for business expenses like payments for tax advisers or wages for the accounting personnel. Even 
in case of the time burden of a self-employed entrepreneur, one may argue that the opportunity cost is the net in-
come for additional working effort (Tran-Nam et al. 2000). This implies an implicit deductibility of these cost ele-
ments. 
3   For simplicity, we expect that the taxpayers´ subjective audit probability 
* p  is equal to the true detection probabil-
ity. This is not a necessary condition. The inclusion of a subjective probability  p  would not yield to different impli-
cations of the model regarding our question of research. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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In case of an audit a noncompliant taxpayer has to pay a penalty q  depending on the amount of 
evaded income  E  and the tax rate 
' T . Hence, the taxpayer receives the net income  a X  
( ) ( ) ( ). , , E I Y C E C Y T Y X t t a - + - - = q   (2) 
The taxpayer optimizes its expected utility  EU  
( ) ( ) ( ). 1 n a X U p X U p EU × - + × =   (3) 
The first order condition for the evasion decision is described by 
( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 1 1 1
































a q    (4) 
According to condition 4, the choice of E depends on the degree of risk aversion, the tax rate 
' T , 
the detection probability p, the marginal effect on compliance costs  t C  and the marginal penalty 
for  evaded  income.  In  case  of  an  audit,  there  is  a  negative  marginal  income 
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2.2.  Tax administration 
The tax administration controls private taxpayers to reduce the expected level of tax evasion. 
We assume a fixed budget B of the revenue service for this target (for the optimal budget see 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1987, McCubbin 2003, and Liang and Yang 2007). In our setting the tax 
collection agency has two opportunities to spend its resources. It may enhance its audit strategy 
A (Yitzhaki and Vakneen 1989, and Cremer and Gahvari 1996) to improve the chance of detect-
ing a tax evader. As an alternative, it could increase the information requirements I to reduce 
the information asymmetry in relation to private taxpayers. Evidently, the collection of taxpayer 
data is a necessary precondition for audit selection processes that have been analyzed by Alm et 
al. (1993) and Nigrini (1996). 
Both actions result in administrative costs for the revenue service   a C . We expect that the effec-
tiveness of tax audits and information requirements decreases in the amount of resources allo-
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tive effect of the information requirements on the taxpayers´ compliance costs.
4 As the effective-
ness of both instruments is taken into account by the cost function  a C , we assume for simplicity 
that the detection probability is a linear function of A + I.  
According to the public administration literature (Khademian 1995, Waterman and Meier 1998), 
public authorities typically concentrate on their mission that is defined by the legislator. There-
fore, it is appropriate to anticipate that the tax authorities´ target lies in the minimization of 
non-compliance as well as in the maximization of the tax payment. The expected value of an 
average payment (including penalties for tax evasion) can be described by  
( ) ( ) ( ). 1
* * * * E C Y T p C Y T p EV t t - - × - + + - × = q   (6)  
* E , 
*
t C  and 
* q  denote the optimal level of evasion, compliance costs and penalties from a tax-
payers´ perspective. Including the administrative costs of the tax authorities with the shadow 
price λ, we obtain the Langrangian function 
( ) ( ). , B A I C EV L a - × - = l   (7) 
The following first order conditions can be derived for information requirements I and audit 
strategies A 
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n a l   (9) 
a T  denotes the tax payment for the detection case, while  n T  describes the tax payment in case of 
no audit. In the optimum the marginal expected revenue from controlling actions  ( ) n a T T p - ×
'
corresponds to the marginal administrative costs plus the expected decrease in tax revenue due 









' . Equalling 8 and 9, we can derive a decision rule 














































                                                           
4   Increasing information requirements imply a more sophisticated documentation. By contrast, the effect of an en-
hanced audit strategy on compliance costs is not straightforward. Taking into account that audits are costly, the 
compliance costs should increase in the number of tax audits. However, an enhancement of the audit strategy not 
necessarily implies a higher audit number. Furthermore and in contrast to documentation costs, auditing costs rep-
resent only a minor part of the overall compliance cost burden (Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002, DeLuca et al. 2005). 
Therefore, we neglect a potential correlation of compliance costs and audit strategy for simplicity. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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 plus the reduction of taxes 
due to an increase in taxpayers’ compliance costs 
*
t C  weighted with the Lagrange multiplier λ. 
According to this criterion, tax  authorities only partially account compliance costs resulting 








 can be in-
terpreted as externalities of tax authority behavior.  
Due to the neglect of a considerable part of the cost burden resulting from authority behavior, 
an economically inefficient outcome can be expected. This argument is reinforced by the fact 
that the tax administration has a limited ability in observing cost burdens of private taxpayers. 
According  to  empirical  evidence  (Hudson  and  Godwin  2000,  Slemrod  and  Venkatesh  2002, 
Klun and Blažić 2005) the lion´s share of the costs of red tape consists of personnel costs and 
material expenses that are not itemized within the tax statements and are therefore ”invincible” 
for the revenue service. 
2.3.  Economic inefficiency 
The economic inefficiency of the externalities exemplified in 2.2. can be demonstrated if we 
compare this outcome with a tax agency maximizing a social welfare function instead of mini-
mizing tax evasion (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1987, and McCubbin 2003). Except from the public 
good G, the expected utility of the representative household can be described by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). , , 1 , ,
* * * * * * * * E I Y C E C Y T Y U p E I Y C C Y T Y U p EU t t t t - - - - × - + - + - - × = q   (11) 
The expected tax revenue has to be sufficient to finance the public good G plus the administra-
tive costs  a C . Taking into account this budget constraint  ( ) EV C G a = + , we obtain a Langran-
gian function with the shadow price w  
( ) ( ). 1 a n a C G T p T p EU L - - × - + × × + = w   (12) 
The first order conditions for A and I are defined as 
( ) ( ) 0
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Equalling both conditions results in 














































  (15) 
The main difference to condition 10 lies in the acknowledgment of the full amount of compli-
ance costs that is weighted by the shadow price w  and the marginal effects on the utility func-










is not weighted with a Lagrange multiplier. Therefore, a tax agency optimizing social welfare 
gives an identical weight to administrative costs and the loss of tax revenue. Furthermore, it 
also accounts for compliance costs burdening private taxpayers. 
A tax collection agency neglecting the overall cost burden has an incentive to “shift” adminis-
trative activities to the private sector. As documented by 10 and 15, this implies an inefficiently 
high amount of resources allocated to information requirements and record-keeping activities, 
while the investments in audit strategies are comparatively low. This conclusion is in line with 
the high proportion of documentation costs to total compliance costs. 
It is an important question what factors have a significant influence on the exemplified ineffi-
ciency of authority behavior. The effect of a change of one of the model variables on the relative 
attractiveness of A compared to I can be demonstrated by the partial derivatives of the decision 
rule R representing the choice between A and I.5 A positive derivative of R implies that there is 
an increase in the marginal costs of A compared to I. In this case, we would expect a relative 
decrease of resources allocated to A. A negative derivative of R has an opposite effect. 
Taking into account that the shadow price  l  represents the scarcity of the administrative re-
sources, we interpret it as a negative function of the budget B. A higher budget of an agency 
generally implies a lower opportunity cost of the administrative resources. Therefore, we expect 
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.  Under  these  conditions,  a  higher 
budget B results in a negative derivative of R, thus increasing the relative attractiveness of A. By 
contrast, a low budget implies a higher “shifting of red tape” from the authorities to private 
                                                           
5   However, these derivatives do not allow for a conclusion on the absolute effect of an exogenous shock on A and I. 
The absolute effect depends not only on the relative attractiveness of both instruments but also on the overall effec-
tiveness of auditing and information requirements as well as on the question if A and I are substitutes or comple-
ments. A more detailed analysis including the comparative statics results is included within the appendix. Due to 
the interdependency of A and I, we find ambiguous results in this setting. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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taxpayers. The motivation for this behavior lies in the limitation of administrative resources. If 
the budget of the revenue service is not sufficient to facilitate an effective audit strategy, the 
agency “shifts” administrative obligations to private taxpayers to ensure at least a minimum 
compliance level with the tax law. From this perspective, an insufficient budget of fiscal au-
thorities could result in economic inefficiency. 
The following derivative documents the effect of the expected evasion 















  (17) 
The impact of 






. If the combination of I and 
* E  increases com-
pliance costs, this results in a higher attractiveness of A that has in our setting no significant ef-








 it remains unclear if the degree of evasion increases or reduces the ex-
pected “shifting of red tape” to private businesses even if we ignore the possible interdepend-
encies between the choice of A and I. 
By contrast, there is no direct effect of an exogenous shock of audit probability on the choice 
between A and I. This result of condition 18 is especially driven by our assumption that p is a 






  (18) 
An  exogenous  increase  in  compliance  costs  (documented  by  a  cost  parameter  g   with 
* *
t t C C × = g )  as well as higher tax rates ceteris paribus raise the attractiveness of A in relation to 


























  (20) 
Due to the fact that higher tax payments or compliance costs increase the negative effect of in-
formation requirements on the tax revenue, they reduce the incentive for the administrative 
authorities to “shift” tax obligations to the private sector. As has been outlined above, the rela-
tive effects on the choice between A and I do not allow for a conclusion regarding the absolute 
effects on these instruments. 6 For example, a higher tax rate could generally increase the incen-
                                                           
6   See the comparative statics results within the appendix. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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tive to control private taxpayers resulting in higher absolute values for A and I. Nevertheless, a 
higher tax rate would also increase the attractiveness of A in relation to I. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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3.  Empirical analysis 
In  the  following  section,  we  present  an  empirical  analysis  of  tax  compliance  cost  data.  We 
document and quantify the expected effects of authority behavior on tax compliance costs. Fur-
thermore, we demonstrate that the impact of administrative issues is not identical to the effect 
of the tax legislation on the compliance cost burden. 
3.1.  Data base 
We use survey data of Belgian businesses raised by the Federal Planning Bureau. Our data 
source contains information on the personnel costs and the external costs resulting from bu-
reaucratic obligations of taxation.7 The cost measurement is similar to OECD (2001). The data 
consists of four cross-sections regarding the years 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006. Due to the fact that 
our data source is not a panel, most of the records are one-shot observations. Each survey con-
tains two separated samples for enterprises in the legal form of a corporation and independent 
businesses (for further information see De Vil and Kegels 2002, Joos and Kegels 2004, Janssen et 
al. 2006, and Kegels 2008). 
In addition to the cost burden the data includes ”demographic” information on business size 
(turnover, number of employees), industry and region, ratings on the Belgian tax policy and 
ratings on the quality and customer care of the Belgian revenue service. For specific years, there 
is also information regarding business age, the number of establishments in Belgium, the legal 
form, the use of different information technology tools for tax purposes and proposals to sim-
plify the overall tax system. 
The following table documents the mean and the median (in parentheses) compliance cost bur-
dens of sampled Belgian businesses in euro. The table contains separate values for independent 
businesses (IND) as well as for small (SE), medium (ME) and big enterprises (BE). According to 
the size criteria of the European Union,8 we define enterprises with less than 50 (between 50 and 
249) employees as small (medium). The case number is also considered [in parentheses]. 
                                                           
7   Employment taxes and social insurance contributions are not included. They are part of additional statistical mate-
rial of the Federal Planning Bureau about the compliance costs of labour legislation. 
8   See the recommendation of the European Communities K (2003) 1422 from the 6ht of May 2003. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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Table 1: Absolute cost burdens 
Survey    IND    SE    ME    BE 
2000  4,550 (2,975) [117] 40,110 (10,055) [ 87] 66,738 (17,105) [12] 201,506 (87,382) [32]
2002  11,044 (2,856) [174] 171,232 (14,310) [106] 85,681 (39,000) [23] 145,108 (62,250) [40]
2004  8,054 (3,240) [142] 74,490 (12,060) [ 77] 36,004 (25,020) [32] 304,529 (62,400) [61]
2006  2,400 (1,250) [113] 30,801 (10,000) [ 72] 39,024 (14,563) [20] 74,009 (30,750) [47]
According to table 1, the cost burden increases in business size. Like documented by the case 
numbers, the lion´s share of our data base consists of small businesses. The differences between 
median and mean values are remarkable. This results from the variance in business size as well 
as from considerable economies of scale that are documented by the relative cost burdens in 
table 2 (in % of the turnover). 
Table 2: Relative cost burdens 
Survey    IND    SE    ME    BE 
2000  14.29 (5.83) [109] 10.19 (0.96) [80] 0.65 (0.17) [12] 9.98 (0.04) [32]
2002  221.03 (4.77) [158] 4.15 (0.80) [99] 0.33 (0.13) [23] 0.11 (0.04) [37]
2004  301.12 (4.64) [130] 17.90 (0.80) [74] 4.54 (0.22) [31] 2.99 (0.09) [60]
2006  11.03 (3.04) [100] 77.05 (0.66) [67] 0.13 (0.10) [20] 0.10 (0.03) [47]
According to literature, we find evidence for economies of scale. The cost ratios are significantly 
higher for independents and small businesses compared to the bigger size classes. Nevertheless, 
we also find high differences of cost ratios between mean and median values. That holds espe-
cially for independents in 2002 and 2004, small enterprises in 2006, medium enterprises in 2004 
and big enterprises in 2000. The main reason for this outcome lies in the fact that a very low 
turnover results in a proportion of compliance costs to turnover converging to infinity. For ex-
ample, the independents survey 2002 contains cases with a turnover of less than 10 euro and 
very high cost ratios. Nevertheless, the differences between mean and median values suggest 
also that an analysis for outliers is an appropriate measure. 
3.2.  Hypotheses and estimation strategy 
Our data base contains ratings on a number of administrative actions. We interpret these ratings 
as a proxy for authority behavior. Therefore, we expect that a positive rating is connected with a 
reduction of compliance costs, while a negative rating indicates a customer-unfriendly behavior 
like “shifting of red tape” from the administrative authorities to private businesses. 
The data set includes seven questions on administrative quality. Question 1 (Q1A) asks for the 
simplicity of finding the right agency (AGENCY). Q2A is about the difficulty in contacting 
competent  service  personnel  (PERSONNEL).  Q3A  issues  precise  answers  of  the  authorities 
(ANSWER).  Q4A  addresses  the  aspect  if  administrative  decisions  are  clearly  motivated 
(MOTIVATION). Q5A asks for the time delay for a requested answer (DELAY). Q6A relates to WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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contradictions  between  the  answers  of  different  administrative  staff  members 
(CONTRADICTION), while Q7A broaches the subject if businesses obtain the required informa-
tion (INFORMATION). The answers are given on a 5-point Likert scale. The following table 
contains the absolute (the relative in %) frequencies of the corresponding answers. 1 is a posi-
tive and 5 is a negative rating. Businesses without a specific opinion are considered by a value 
of 3.9 
Table 3: Ratings for tax administration 
Survey    1    2    3    4    5  Total
AGENCY  108 (6.99) 581 (37.58) 95 (6.14) 487 (31.50) 275 (17.79) 1,546
PERSONNEL  89 (5.79) 535 (34.81) 109 (7.09) 517 (33.64) 287 (18.67) 1,537
ANSWER  72 (4.67) 629 (40.79) 144 (9.34) 487 (31.58) 210 (13.62) 1,542
MOTIVATION  61 (3.96) 514 (33.40) 192 (12.48) 563 (36.58) 209 (13.58) 1,539
DELAY  96 (6.25) 709 (46.13) 173 (11.26) 356 (23.16) 203 (13.21) 1,537
CONTRADICTION 49 (3.20) 416 (27.17) 351 (22.93) 491 (32.07) 224 (14.63) 1,531
INFORMATION  59 (3.84) 725 (47.20) 194 (12.63) 426 (27.73) 132 (8.59) 1,536
We find a considerable variance in the distribution of ratings. For example only about 30 % of 
the  requested  businesses  did  give  a  positive  rating  regarding  possible  contradictions  in  the 
statements of administrative staff members (CONTRADICTION). By contrast, most of the re-
quested  businesses  were  altogether  convinced  to  receive  the  required  information 
(INFORMATION). 
A problem in estimating the effect of authority behavior on administrative cost burdens lies in a 
potential endogeneity of the rating variable. A correlation could not only result from the author-
ity behavior itself but also from the dissatisfaction of the taxpayer with the tax legislation or the 
compliance burden or the tax system. According to this argument, taxpayers with high compli-
ance costs could ”punish” the tax administration by negative ratings. On the other hand, it has 
to be expected that negative and positive are significantly affected by the experiences of taxpay-
ers with the administrative authorities. Therefore, if the ratings are reliable they should be a 
good proxy for authority behavior from a taxpayers’ perspective.   
The data source contains not only ratings on administrative issues but also on tax law quality. 
This information can be used as a control parameter for the reliability of the ratings regarding 
authority behavior. If the ratings of private businesses result mainly from a single factor like the 
compliance cost burden (endogeneity of the value judgment), we would expect a high degree of 
collinearity of all rating variables. Hence, the taxpayer would punish or reward the authorities 
as well as the legislator with a generally positive or negative rating that results especially from 
the compliance cost burden and not vice versa. In this case, we would expect that taxpayers 
with high compliance costs give a negative rating for legislative as well as for administrative 
issues. Regarding taxpayers with low compliance costs we should find an opposite effect. 
                                                           
9    In the original questionnaire a rating of 5 was allocated to businesses without a specific opinion. In our paper we 
allocated a rating of 3 for readability reasons. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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The data  set contains seven questions regarding tax legislation. Q1L broaches the subject if 
businesses are informed in advance about new tax regulations (ADVANCE). Q2L asks for the 
understandability of the tax law (UNDERSTANDABLE) and Q3L for clear objectives of tax leg-
islation (OBJECTIVE). Q4L addresses the issue if tax regulations  are sufficiently adapted to 
business situations (ADAPTION). Q5L asks for information in sufficient time to comply with 
the tax law (TIME). Q6L issues the coherency of the tax legislation (COHERENCY), while Q7L 
addresses the corresponding information material of the legislator (MATERIAL). The following 
table contains the absolute (the relative in %) frequencies for these questions: 
Table 4: Ratings for tax legislation 
Survey  1    2    3    4    5  Total
ADVANCE  133 (8.74) 447 (29.37) 191 (12.55) 422 (27.73) 329 (21.62) 1,522
UNDERSTANDABLE  39 (2.54)  328 (21.33) 87   (5.66) 639 (41.55) 445 (28.93) 1,538
OBJECTIVE  73 (4.79) 428 (28.07) 130   (8.52) 597 (37.97) 315 (20.66) 1,525
ADAPTION  35 (2.30) 299 (19.61) 184 (12.07) 612 (40.13) 395 (25.90) 1,525
TIME  112 (7.28) 604 (39.25) 115   (7.47) 432 (28.07) 276 (17.93) 1,539
COHERENCY  42 (2.74) 307 (20.03) 244 (15.92) 587 (38.29) 353 (23.03) 1,533
MATERIAL  45 (2.93) 417 (27.18) 153   (9.97) 589 (38.40) 330 (21.51) 1,534
The frequencies do not seem to support the hypothesis of a strong correlation between adminis-
trative and legislative ratings. On average, the requested businesses have a lower rating for tax 
legislation compared to the tax administration. Furthermore, there are also remarkable differ-
ences  regarding  the  distribution  of  the  legislative  ratings  (for  example  TIME  and 
UNDERSTANDABLE). The following table documents the correlations of the legislative and 
administrative rating variables. 
Table 5: Rating correlations 
Survey  Q1L Q2L Q3L Q4L Q5L Q6L Q7L Q1A Q2A Q3A Q4A Q5A Q6A Q7A
Q1L  1.000 0.434 0.356 0.372 0.396 0.349 0.394 0.295 0.252 0.291 0.329 0.257 0.301 0.308
Q2L  1.000 0.610 0.540 0.467 0.472 0.566 0.417 0.353 0.376 0.339 0.304 0.231 0.336
Q3L  1.000 0.555 0.425 0.504 0.503 0.333 0.305 0.345 0.347 0.299 0.258 0.358
Q4L  1.000 0.452 0.604 0.556 0.310 0.282 0.359  0.375 0.326 0.316 0.393
Q5L  1.000 0.424 0.550 0.317 0.287 0.374 0.351 0.328 0.200 0.345
Q6L  1.000 0.592 0.288 0.280 0.365 0.405 0.334 0.344 0.386
Q7L  1.000 0.358 0.328 0.366 0.413 0.330 0.302 0.391
Q1A  1.000 0.692 0.532 0.426 0.446 0.322 0.489
Q2A  1.000 0.566 0.447 0.476 0.301 0.490
Q3A  1.000 0.573 0.546 0.398 0.624
Q4A  1.000 0.546 0.414 0.554
Q5A  1.000 0.451 0.596
Q6A  1.000 0.470
Q7A  1.000
Evidently, the coefficients are considerably higher for correlations within administrative or leg-
islative ratings. For example, the coefficients of Q1L for correlations with other legislative rat-WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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ings lie in a range from 0.349 to 0.434, while the range for correlations with administrative rat-
ings is about 10 percentage points lower (from 0.257 to 0.329). Furthermore, we find also a con-
siderable variance of the correlation coefficients. While there is a very strong correlation be-
tween Q1A and Q2A (AGENCY and PERSONNEL), the coefficient for the connection between 
Q1A and Q1L (ADVANCE) is relatively low. 
The observed diversity and interdependency of rating behavior does not support the hypothesis 
that the ratings are mainly driven by a single factor. Hence, the empirical support for a strong 
effect of tax compliance costs on the overall rating behavior is relatively weak. Furthermore, we 
find also that ratings for similar issues (like AGENCY and PERSONNEL) are strongly corre-
lated to each other compared to ratings for separate aspects (like ADVANCE and AGENCY). As 
an exogenous event should affect ratings for related aspects in a similar direction, this can be 
interpreted as an empirical support for a rating behavior that is mainly driven by exogenous 
factors like the experiences of the taxpayer.  
Corresponding to the literature (Hudson  and Godwin 2000), we use an OLS model for our 
econometric analysis. Taking into account that most cases are one-shot observations, we would 
lose the greater part of the overall information if we choose a panel estimation method. Includ-
ing the control parameters that are available for each year we receive: 
e a a a
a a a a a
+ × + × + × +
× + × + × + × + =
N LEGISLATIO TION ADMINISTRA ADVICE
YEAR INDUSTRY SURVEY SIZE CCOST
7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
  (21) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
CCOST   Logarithm  of  compliance  costs:  the  compliance  costs  are  defined  as 
sum of personnel costs and external costs. Amounts in Belgian francs 
are  converted  into  euro.  Inflation  effects  are  controlled  by  the  year 
dummies. 
SIZE   Businesses in the independent survey do not have employees. For that 
reason, we deploy the logarithm of turnover as size measure. 
SURVEY  The dummy variable controls for the requested group of the survey. It 
takes a value of 1 (0) for an independent (enterprise) survey. 
INDUSTRY   Set of dummy variables: within the enterprises survey, we control only 
for  industrial  businesses  (EINDUSTRIAL).  Regarding  independents, 
we  control  in  addition  to  IINDUSTRIAL  for  the  primary  sector 
(IPRIMARY)  and  construction  (ICONSTRUCT).  The  other  independ-
ents are active in the services sector. 
YEAR   Set of dummy variables: we consider dummies for 2002, 2004 and 2006 
to control for time series effects. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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ADVICE  Variables measuring the use of external advice: we utilize the logarithm 
of the fraction of external costs to total compliance costs increased by 
1%10  (OUTSOURCING)  as  well  as  a  dummy  variable  for  businesses 
without external advice (INHOUSE). 
ADMINISTRATION   Set of rating variables for administrative issues. 
LEGISLATION   Set of rating variables for legislative issues. 
As our data set contains Likert scale values, it is appropriate to consider the rating behavior by 
dummy variables. However, taking into account all questions on administrative and legislative 
issues would result in 56 dummy variables within one equation. Hence, the regression would 
be biased by multicollinearity. Therefore, we initially analyze the effect of the dummy variables 
in a ”stepwise” approach taking into account only one rating question in each specification. For 
each question, we analyze the effects of a very positive, a positive, a negative and a very nega-
tive rating on the compliance cost burden. 
As documented by table 1 and table 2, the data set contains a number of outliers that could bias 
our regression results. Therefore, we initially exclude these cases from the data set. We use two 
standard deviations of a simplified regression including only business size, survey and survey 
year as outlier criterion. Hence, we exclude all cases with considerably high or low compliance 
cost values compared to business size, year and survey effects. According to this criterion, 60 
cases were identified as outliers. 
e a a a a + × + × + × + = YEAR SURVEY SIZE CCOST 3 2 1 0   (22) 
As documented by Hudson and Godwin (2000) and Eichfelder and Schorn (2009), heteroscedas-
ticity is a problem regarding the estimation of tax compliance costs. For that reason, we use ro-
bust standard errors for our econometric analysis. 
3.3.  Results 
Excluding all rating variables, we obtain the following regression results (
2 R = 0.6554, 1,013 
cases), where ***, ** and * indicate a significant result on a 1%, 5% and 10% level: 
                                                           
10   We add 0.01 to prevent undefined logarithmic values. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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Table 6: Basic model excluding rating behavior 
Variable  Coefficient  STD DEV 
Constant  5.163***  0.277 
SIZE  0.286***  0.018 
SURVEY  -0.293**  0.115 
2002  0.076  0.083 
2004  0.095  0.088 
2006  -0.439***  0.104 
EINDUSTRIAL  0.116  0.095 
IINDUSTRIAL  0.267  0.211 
IPRIMARY  -0.888***  0.101 
ICONSTRUCTION  -0.044  0.099 
WALLONIA  -0.141*  0.075 
BRUSSELS  0.078  0.097 
OUTSOURCING  -0.288***  0.050 
INHOUSE  -1.795***  0.220 
In accordance to the literature (Hudson and Godwin 2000), we find a regressive impact of tax 
compliance costs. The high constant implies fixed cost elements. The correlation coefficient of 
SIZE being smaller than one indicates that a growth of turnover by 1% results in an increase in 
compliance costs by only 0.286%. We also find evidence for higher compliance costs of the en-
terprises survey. This should be due to the legal form, as respondents in the enterprises survey 
are corporations. 
In terms of the survey years, we find no clear evidence for a positive or a negative cost trend. In 
spite of that the compliance cost burden in 2006 seems to be significantly smaller than in 2000, 
2002 and 2004. The main reason for this result should be a different phrasing of the question-
naire in 2006. Regarding the industry, we find evidence for lower compliance costs in the pri-
mary sector (regularly farmers). Furthermore, there is empirical support for lower costs in the 
Wallonian part of Belgium as well as a connection of tax-related cost burdens and the use of 
external resources (for a more detailed analysis of that aspect see Eichfelder and Schorn 2009). 
Integrating dummy variables for each question on administrative quality in a ”stepwise” ap-
proach yields to the following correlation coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses): WORKING PAPER 9-10 
 
17 
Table 7: Results on administrative ratings 
Variable  Very positive  Positive  Negative  Very negative 
AGENCY  0.137   (0.179)  0.133   (0.142)  0.156   (0.146)  0.263*   (0.152) 
PERSONNEL  0.185   (0.178)  0.220*   (0.129)  0.185   (0.130)  0.409***   (0.141) 
ANSWER  -0.115   (0.162)  0.131   (0.109)  0.232**   (0.113)  0.367***   (0.129) 
MOTIVATION  -0.205   (0.187)  0.158   (0.110)  0.202*   (0.110)  0.381***   (0.124) 
DELAY  0.001   (0.145)  0.060   (0.114)  0.282**   (0.121)  0.257*   (0.133) 
CONTRADICTION  0.082   (0.200)  0.093   (0.087)  0.101   (0.087)  0.237**   (0.100) 
INFORMATION  0.094   (0.176)  0.115   (0.100)  0.359***   (0.107)  0.584***   (0.136) 
First of all, we can state a positive impact of negative ratings on the compliance cost burden, 
while there is in general no significant effect of positive ratings. Hence, taxpayers with a posi-
tive rating on average do not have a significantly lower cost burden as respondents who did not 
give a rating of authority behavior. From this perspective, authority behavior is especially an 
issue if it results in problems for private taxpayers (negative ratings). Corresponding problems 
could result from mistakes of the administration or from ”shifting” of administrative cost bur-
dens to private taxpayers. 
In contrast, a high degree of contentment (for example due to a very friendly administration) 
does not necessarily reduce the costs of red tape. Furthermore, the effect of authority behavior 
depends on the considered aspect. While we find only a barely significant effect of problems to 
find the right agency (AGENCY), there is a strong and positive correlation of compliance costs 
and businesses who did not obtain the required information (INFORMATION). 
Taking into account the results above, it seems appropriate to exclude positive ratings for fur-
ther analysis. To restrict the number of variables, we also use only one rating variable for each 
question. Therefore, negative and very negative ratings are consolidated in one dummy. Includ-
ing also negative rating variables on legislative issues, we receive as our final estimate (R2 = 
0.6674, 937 cases): WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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Table 8: Results of the extended model 
Variable  Coefficient  STD DEV  VIF 
AGENCY  -0.062  0.076  1.49 
PERSONNEL  -0.086  0.078  1.63 
ANSWER  -0.032  0.079  1.66 
MOTIVATION  -0.023  0.078  1.46 
DELAY  0.144*  0.074  1.32 
CONTRADICTION  -0.060  0.073  1.31 
INFORMATION  0.229***  0.086  1.71 
ADVANCE  0.013  0.069  1.25 
UNDERSTANDABLE  0.143*  0.081  1.56 
OBJECTIVE  -0.043  0.077  1.40 
ADAPTION  0.001  0.081  1.47 
TIME  0.137*  0.074  1.33 
COHERENCY  0.154*  0.083  1.55 
MATERIAL  0.067  0.075  1.57 
SIZE  0.279***  0.019  2.63 
SURVEY  -0.340***  0.120  3.42 
2002  0.130  0.084  1.67 
2004  0.153*  0.093  1.65 
2006  -0.321***  0.108  2.08 
EINDUSTRIAL  0.161  0.099  1.51 
IINDUSTRIAL  0.316  0.238  1.09 
IPRIMARY  -0.834***  0.103  1.56 
ICONSTRUCTION  0.036  0.101  1.42 
OUTSOURCING  -0.270***  0.052  3.42 
INHOUSE  -1.710***  0.228  3.47 
WALLONIE  -0.149**  0.080  1.14 
BRUSSELS  0.060**  0.098  1.57 
Constant  4.920***  0.295  - 
Also in the extended model, we find a significant and positive effect of negative ratings of au-
thority behavior. Interestingly, the variable INFORMATION seems to be a good proxy for this 
issue. The only other administrative rating variable contributing significantly to the compliance 
cost burden is DELAY. Therefore, it seems to be essential that private businesses are supported 
with the necessary information by the administrative authorities in a reasonable time. 
The model exemplifies that the effect of administrative issues is separate from the effect of the 
tax law itself. Taking into account legislative aspects, the most important subjects seem to be the 
understandability and consistency of the tax law. Furthermore, a new legislation should be in-
troduced in a way that leaves enough time for businesses to take the new regulations into ac-
count (TIME). The rather low significance of these variables results from the fact that they are a 
measure for similar aspects. According to our estimate, the cost burden of a business which is 
not content with the obtained information would increase by about 26 percentage points. A se-
vere time delay adds further 15% to the compliance cost burden.11 
                                                           
11   The additional cost burdens are slightly higher than the coefficients in table 8. This is due to the fact that these coef-
ficients document exclusively the marginal but not the absolute effects of our logarithmic regression model. Regard-
ing dummy-variables, there is no meaningful interpretation of a marginal effect. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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It is an important question of research, to what extent the cost burden could be reduced in case 
of a more ”customer-friendly” administration taking into account not only administrative but 
also compliance costs. The available data does not allow for an analysis of fundamental reform 
measures like a reduction of information requirement of a creation of new customer services for 
private businesses. 
Nevertheless, we may use our regression results to calculate the compliance cost burden in a 
world without negative experiences with the tax administration. On this account, we simulated 
the cost burden by using the regression coefficients of table 8. To identify the effect of adminis-
trative actions, we simulated a models including and a model excluding the significant and 
negative rating variables for DELAY and INFORMATION. We find on average that the neglect 
of negative ratings results in a reduction of the simulated cost burden of 10 % to 14 %. There-
fore, we would expect that a an enhancement of tax administration in a form of best practice 
should result in a reduction of the cost burden by at least 10 %. This value can be taken as a 
lower bound of a potential compliance cost reduction due to a more fundamental reform of tax 
administration. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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4.  Conclusion 
In our paper, we investigated the link between tax authority behavior and the compliance cost 
burdens of private businesses. In a simple microeconomic framework, the compliance costs of 
taxpayers may partially be interpreted as externalities of the control and audit strategy of the 
tax administration. From this perspective, there is an incentive for the tax authorities to ”shift” 
administrative cost burdens to the taxpayer. Corresponding administrative actions imply an 
inefficient outcome reducing the productivity of the overall tax system. As the shadow price of 
administrative actions decreases in the amount of administrative resources, a low budget of a 
tax collection agency could be an incentive to ”shift” a bigger part of the overall cost burden to 
the private sector. 
Empirical results based on a survey of Belgian businesses confirm the results of our analytical 
model. According to our estimate businesses who did not obtain the requested information bear 
an additional cost burden of about 26%. A severe delay in answering a request adds further 15% 
to the cost burden. Altogether these two rating variables explain between 10% and 14% of the 
average cost burden. To control for possible endogeneity, we used comparable rating variables 
on tax legislation. We demonstrated that there is a significant and separate effect of tax admini-
stration and tax legislation on the costs of red tape. 
Our results imply that the simplification of a tax system is not only a legislative but also an ad-
ministrative issue. To reduce the costs of red tape, it seems appropriate to incorporate the exter-
nalities of administrative control and audit strategies in the decision making of the revenue ser-
vice. Due to the very high cost burdens especially of small businesses, we would also expect 
that an extension of taxpayer services could have a share in reducing the administrative cost 
burden of the tax system as a whole. WORKING PAPER 9-10 
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5.  Appendix: Comparative statics results 
The first order conditions of a tax authority minimizing tax evasion are described by 
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This condition can be positive or negative depending on the question if A and I are substitutes 
or complements. The effect of an exogenous shock of a variable X on the optima can be de-
scribed by 
0 2 = × + × + × = dX L dI L dA L dL AX AI A A   (29) 
and 
. 0 2 = × + × + × = dX L dA L dI L dL IX IA I I   (30) 













I AX IX IA
L L L





=   (31) 









A IX AX IA
L L L





=   (32) 
Taking into account 0 2 <
I L ,  0 2 <
A L  and  0 ) (
2
2 2 > - × IA I A L L L , the overall effect of an exogenous 
variable depends on  IX L ,  AX L  and  IA L . Regarding the budget of the revenue service B, we ob-
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, we find a positive effect of both instruments. However, as 
the budget affects exclusively the shadow price of the administrative costs  a C and not the tax 
compliance costs 
*
t C , it seems probable that the effect is stronger in case of an audit strategy A 
compared to information requirements I. From this perspective, the effect of the budget on the 
stated ”shifting” of administrative cost burdens does not seem to be straightforward. If I and A 
are substitutes, a low budget could reduce the resources allocated to A in favour of I. In the al-
ternative case a higher budget should increase the resources allocated to both control instru-
ments.  
For an increase in the level of optimal tax evasion 
* E , we obtain: 
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For the instrument A, we find a positive effect of 
* E  if we ignore the effect on I. Due to the 
higher amount of additional tax revenue in case of a successful audit, tax evasion ceteris paribus 
promotes audit strategies. By contrast, the effect of evasion on information requirements is not 
straightforward. On the one hand, there is a positive effect of the expected tax value in case of 
an audit  ( ) 1
*' ' ' + × × q T p . On the other hand, the effect of tax evasion on compliance costs 
*
t C  is 
unclear. According to Erard and Ho (2003), high tax compliance costs may be correlated to a 







 . In this case, high tax evasion could 
also decrease the incentive of the tax administration for information requirements I. 
Regarding  an  exogenous  increase  in  compliance  costs 
*
t C ,  we  integrate  a  multiplier  with 
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We do not a find an isolated effect of 
*
t C  on A but only a negative impact on I. This is due to the 
fact that in our setting an audit strategy does not significantly affect the compliance burden. If 
both variables are substitutes, an exogenous increase of 
*
t C  should reduce the resources allo-
cated in I in favour of A. A similar argumentation holds for an increase in the linear tax rate. In 
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Evidently, there is a stronger isolated effect on A compared to I as a higher tax rate does not 
only imply an expected gain from detected tax evasion but also a stronger effect of tax compli-
ance costs on the tax payment. However, the overall effect depends also on the interdependency 
of both administrative instruments symbolized by the derivative  AI L . 
By contrast, an exogenous increase in the detection probability has no divergent effect on both 
instruments. This can be documented for p p × =p . Therefore, we would in general not expect 
that an exogenous increase or decrease of the probability has a significant effect on the choice 
between I and A. Nevertheless, as mentioned also for the other exogenous factors, the overall 
effect of p depends on the criteria considered in 31 and 32. Therefore, a general solution de-
pends especially on the sign of  AI L . 
) (
'
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